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Case No. 870550-CA 
Category 14b 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT ENTERED 
BY THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HON. BOYD L. PARK, PRESIDING 
JACKSON HOWARD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
BRYCE D. PANZER, for: 
SKOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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LIST OF PARTIES 
The case caption includes the names of all persons which 
were still parties in this case at the time of trial. 
The initial complaint also named the following persons as 
defendants: Ralph Rollins, Russell Brown, Robert Gunnel1, and 
Harvey Call. (R. 1.) These defendants were represented by 
Jackson Howard, for Howard, Lewis & Petersen. 
Plaintiff was represented in the initial filing of this 
action by Robert 0. Baldwin, of Jardine, Baldwin & Brown, Salt 
Lake City. That firm withdrew on May 27, 1975. (R. 77.) 
Plaintiff was thereafter represented by Reed L. Martineau and 
George A. Hunt, of Worsley, Snow & Christensen, now Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau. (R. 79.) Plaintiffs were represented 
at trial by Bryce D. Panzer of the same firm. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PRICE, for and on 
behalf of PRICE-OREM 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a 
limited partnership, 
Plaint i f f -
Aftpei^mt, 
vs . 
ROLLINS. BROWN, & GUNNELL. 





JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from a Judgment on Jury Verdict entered 
after a jury trial. The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2(3) (i) 
(1987), and transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence an 
appraisal based on estimated income of a shopping center, where 
actual data concerning the income of the shopping center was 
available? 
Case No. 870550-CA 
Category 14b 
2. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict where the evidence established that construction of the 
retail space which plaintiff claimed was lost would have in any 
event been in violation of city ordinances because the shopping 
center had insufficient parking space? 
RELEVANT ORDINANCES 
A copy of the Orem City ordinance regarding parking is 
attached as Appendix f,D". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a tort action for damages alleged to have been 
negligently caused by defendant^1 error in staking the location 
for a building owned by plaintiff. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This action was filed on September 9, 1974 (R. 1.), and was 
initially tried before the Hon. Maurice Harding, sitting with a 
jury, on November 17-19, 1980. (R. 302-05.) The jury returned a 
verdict for plaintiff and assessed damages at $30,000.00. (R. 
Although the Amended Complaint names both Rollins, Brown & 
Gunnell, Inc., and Carr F. Greer as defendants (R. 88-90), Mr. 
Greer had passed away prior to the trial of this matter. (R. 
1193.) No evidence was offered against Mr. Greer or his estate 
at trial, and it appears that he was implicitly "dismissed" from 
the lawsuit sometime prior to trial. 
The term "defendant" as used herein shall accordingly refer 
only to Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc. 
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252.) The defendant thereafter made a Motion for Judgment NOV 
of in the Alternative Motion for a Remittitur or a New Trial (R. 
265), asserting that the damages were excessive because (1) the 
evidence demonstrated that the cost of repair at the time the 
error was discovered was only $3,000.00, and (2) any additional 
retail space would have been in violation of Orem City parking 
ordinances. (R. 266-83.) The trial court held that the 
evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, and further 
held that "there was no culpable negligence on the part of the 
engineers" (R. 350), and granted the motion for a new trial. (R. 
306.) 
The case was rescheduled for trial on March 1, 1983. (R. 
381.) On the day of trial, the trial court, the Hon. David Sam, 
determined that John Price Associates, Inc., was a necessary and 
indispensible party to the action. (R. 373-74.) Upon plain-
tiffs election to not amend its complaint, the action was 
deemed dismissed (id.)# a n d the plaintiff appealed. (R. 376.) 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for trial. 
(R. 400.) Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown and 
Gunnel1. Inc., 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986). 
The case was again brought to trial before the Hon. Boyd L. 
Park, sitting with a jury, on June 1-3, 1987. (R. 661-72.) The 
jury found both parties negligent, and attributed 40% of the 
negligence to plaintiff and 60% to defendant. The jury assessed 
damages of $33,861.00, resulting in a net judgment to plaintiff 
of $20,316.60 plus costs. (R. 765-67.) 
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The Judgment on Jury Verdict signed by the trial court 
fixed costs at $894.20. (Id.) The plaintiff sought an award of 
pre-judgment interest (R. 703), which was denied by the trial 
court. (R. 763-64.) Defendant had previously filed a Motion to 
Tax Costs (R. 761) , and subsequently filed an Amended Motion to 
Tax Costs. (R. 775.) Upon consideration of the Amended Motion, 
the trial court reduced the costs to $297.30. A Ruling and 
Amendment to Judgment reflecting the reduced costs was entered 
on September 18, 1987. (R. 111.) Defendant filed its Notice of 
Appeal on October 1, 1987. (R. 782.) Plaintiff filed a Notice 
of Cross-Appeal on October 15, 1987. (R. 508.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Sometime during the first part of July, 1973, John Price 
Associates, Inc. ("JPA"), contracted with the defendant to have 
a survey done of the site of the Orem Plaza, a shopping center 
owned and developed by Price-Orem, Investment Company, a limited 
partnership. (R. 1323.) Agents of the defendant performed the 
survey in accordance with the terms of the contract. The first 
survey was accurate as of July 27, 1973. (See R. 1823.) After 
the first survey, the plaintiff acquired a second parcel which 
overlapped the first survey on the north. (R. 1323, 1731.) The 
original survey drawing was revised under date August 24, 1973, 
to include the newly acquired parcel. The corner stakes for the 
first survey were left in place. 
In June, 1974, JPA again contracted with the defendant to 
stake the layout of the shopping center building. (R. 1314.) 
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The staking was performed by a crew led by Mr. Thurgood, who was 
then an employee of defendant. (R. 1399.) Mr. Thurgood used as 
a starting point a one-inch steel pin imbedded in the ground and 
which was marked by flagging and other stakes around it, 
including a stake labeled f,N.W. Property Corner". (R. 1404-09, 
1436.) Based on that starting point, Mr. Thurgood and his crew 
staked the building layout. The building layout as staked fit 
properly on top of fill material which had already been placed 
by JPA. (R. 1408-14, 1441.) JPA continued with construction of 
the building in accordance with the stakes placed by defendant. 
Later events revealed that the stake used by Mr. Thurgood 
was not the corner intended to be used by the owner. (R. 1419-
20.) It was, however, the northwest corner of the property 
originally surveyed. The corner that was intended to have been 
used, apparently because of the subsequent property acquisition, 
was about 30 feet to the north of the point used. As a result, 
the building was staked about thirty feet south of the location 
called for on the site plan. Defendant presented several 
proposals to plaintiff to correct the problem, which defendant 
estimated would cost approximately $3,000.00. (R. 1760.) 
Plaintiff rejected the proposals (R. 1765), and determined to 
adjust for the error by shortening the shop space by 30 feet. 
(R. 1299.) Because the shop spaces as constructed were 70 feet 
deep, plaintiff claimed to have lost 2100 square feet of shop 
space by reason of the error. 
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Plaintiff's evidence concerning the value of the lost space 
was given by Ralph Wright, an appraiser, who testified concern-
ing an appraisal he had performed prior to May 26, 1977. (R. 
1485.) The appraisal was based on an assumption that the then-
existing leases or similar leases would continue (R. 1483), and 
that the vacancy rate in the shopping center would be ap-
proximately 5%. (R. 1504.) Mr. Wright did not make any adjust-
ments for the high number of vacancies existing in the shopping 
center at the time of trial. (R. 1529-40.) Mr. Wright, using an 
income approach to valuation, estimated that the present value 
of the lost income over 40 years was $72,351.00. (Ex. 12.) He 
estimated that the cost of constructing the lost space would 
have been $42,000.00 (R. 1515), yielding a net loss of 
$30,351.00. 
Plaintiff also claimed that it paid $3,000.00 to redraw the 
plans for the shopping center (R. 1292), $210.00 for some 
additional curb and gutter work (R. 1306; see also R. 1834), and 
$300.00 for miscellaneous extra piping. (Id.) 
Substantial competent evidence was presented concerning the 
amount of parking required for the complex. Both Mr. Brown, who 
was the Orem City Engineer in 1974 and who was familiar with the 
ordinances relating to shopping center construction, and Mr. 
Randall Deschamps, the planning director for Orem City during 
the relevant time period, testified that the shopping center as 
constructed did not have sufficient parking to comply with 
applicable Orem City ordinances. (R. 1646, 1773.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant presented uncontroverted evidence that plaintiff 
suffered no damage. The shopping center as built was in 
violation of Orem City ordinances regarding the minimum amount 
of parking space required. Construction of the additional 2100 
square feet would have only compounded the violation, and would 
have been illegal. It was error to award any damages for 
plaintifffs inability to construct an illegal building. 
Even if the plaintiff was entitled to an award of damages, 
plaintiff did not present any competent evidence of the damages 
actually suffered by plaintiff. The jury's award of damages was 
based predominately upon an appraisal performed in 1977, over 
ten years prior to the trial of this case. The appraisal had 
been based on estimates concerning vacancy rates which subse-
quent events proved erroneous, and in addition used estimates of 
the probable income from the shopping center even though 
information concerning the actual income history of the center 
was available. Such evidence in inherently speculative. 
Although such evidence may have been admissible if this case had 
been tried in 1977, it was irrelevant and inadmissible in 1987. 
Plaintiff did not present any competent evidence concerning 
damages, and defendant's motions for a directed verdict and for 




THE PLAINTIFF SUFFERED NO DAMAGES. 
Substantial competent evidence was presented at trial that 
the shopping center, as finally constructed, was in violation of 
Orem City Ordinances, in that it had too few parking spaces for 
the amount of retail and restaurant space. Although the 
plaintiff argued that it had been deprived of an additional 2100 
square feet of floor space, construction of the additional space 
would have been illegal. 
It is well established that an award of damages based on 
violation of the law is against public policy. There are 
numerous occasions in which courts have had an opportunity to 
deal with an illegal use. One such area is that of eminent 
domain. As stated by the Arizona Supreme Court in Gear v. City 
of Phoenix. 93 Ariz. 260, 379 P.2d 972 (1963), "the availability 
of land for a use which is prohibited by law cannot be con-
sidered in determining its value in eminent domain proceedings." 
379 P.2d at 974 (citations omitted). 
In this case, the ordinances of Orem City were established 
and the agents and employees of Orem City testified to their 
implementation. In tort, the plaintiff is prohibited from 
putting on evidence of damages which result from activities or 
situations prohibited by statutes or ordinances. 
The plaintiff has attempted to prove damages by establish-
ing the value of an imaginary 2100 square feet of retail space 
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which was not constructed and which, if constructed, would be a 
patent violation of the Orem City Ordinances. It is clear that 
the plaintiff in fact suffered no damage in the eyes of the law. 
Plaintiff attempted to rebut the undisputed evidence of 
insufficient parking by arguing that had the extra space been 
constructed, and had plaintiff been aware of the insufficiency 
of the parking, plaintiff might have been able to make adjust-
ments to come into compliance with the law. (E.g.. R. 1712.) 
This argument is not persuasive. Plaintiff's evidence of damage 
was based on projected income from the use made of the shopping 
center at the time of the appraisal. It would be obviously 
unfair and illogical to allow plaintiff to claim that a hypothe-
tical use of the property might have been lawful, but to claim 
damages based on an actual, illegal, use. 
The undisputed evidence established, as a matter of law, 
that plaintiff suffered no damages. The trial court erred in 
failing to direct a verdict for defendant. 
POINT II 
IT WAS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF ESTIMATED 
LOSS WHEN EVIDENCE CONCERNING ACTUAL LOSS 
WAS AVAILABLE, 
The desired objective in computing damages "is to evaluate 
any loss suffered by the most direct, practical and accurate 
method that can be employed." Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22 
Utah 2d 49, 448 P.2d 709. 711 (1968). In compensating an 
injured party for damages to real property two basic rules have 
emerged: the (1) "diminution in value" rule (difference between 
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the value of property before and after an injury); and (2) 
"restoration" or "cost of repairs" rule (the cost of repairing 
realty to its original condition). 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 132 
(1965) . See also Leishman v, Kamas Valley Lumber Co., 19 Utah 
2d 150, 427 P.2d 747 (1967); Rex T. Fuhriman, Inc. v. Jarrell, 
21 Utah 2d 298, 445 P.2d 136 (1963). The plaintiff had the 
burden of proving both measures of damages, and would be 
entitled to receive only the lesser amount. See Hoaland v. 
Klein. 49 Wash. 2d 216, 298 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1956). 
It is axiomatic that while damages need not be proved with 
exactitude, they must be proved with reasonable certainty. 
Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986). For 
example, in the Sawyers case where the plaintiff was seeking 
lost profits, the Court indicated that "[Reasonable certainty 
requires more than a mere estimate of net profits. In addition 
to proof of gross profits, there must generally be supporting 
evidence of overhead expenses, or other costs of producing 
income from which a net figure can be derived." Id. (citations 
omitted). 
A necessary corollary to the rule that damages must be 
proved with reasonable certainty is the inverse rule that 
"recovery of damages will not be allowed when the trier of facts 
must rely upon evidence which leaves those damages uncertain or 
speculative." 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 22 at page 40 (1965). 
Furthermore, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to "produce 
a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish the fact of damages 
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and to permit the trier of fact to determine with reasonably 
certainty the amount of [damages]," Sawyers, 772 P.2d at 774. 
Additionally, in order to recover, the plaintiff must have 
"produced the best evidence available . . . to afford a reason-
able basis for estimating his loss." Id., § 25 at page 45. In 
coming up with an estimate, "[e]vents which occur after the 
wrong complained of may serve to render the damages sufficiently 
certain." Id., at page 46. Finally, to authorize recovery for 
more than nominal damages, "[t]he damages must be susceptible to 
ascertainment in some manner other than by mere speculation, 
conjecture, or surmise, and be referenced to some fairly 
definite standard, such as market value, established experience 
or direct inference from known circumstances." Id. 
Application of these principles to the facts of the case at 
bar reveals that the evidence plaintiff presented failed to meet 
the fundamental requirements of admissible proof and was too 
speculative to support an award of damages. 
The jury's award of $33,381.00, appears to be the sum of 
(1) the estimated lost income from the 2100 square feet of lost 
space according to the testimony of Mr. Wright ($72,351.00) (Ex. 
12), less the estimated cost of construction of that 2100 square 
foot section ($42,000.00) (R. 1515), (2) the plaintifffs 
undocumented testimony that it paid $3,000.00 to an architect to 
redesign the building (R. 1292), (3) $210.00 for certain curb 
and gutter work, and (4) $300.00 for miscellaneous extra piping 
(R. 1306). Neither the total sum, nor each element thereof, was 
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proven with the reasonable certainty required by Utah law. 
Rather, each element was either speculation or a guess on the 
plaintiff's part or an undocumented expense. In short, not only 
did plaintiff fail to produce the best evidence available to 
afford a reasonable basis for estimating its loss, it failed to 
produce any evidence other than mere conjecture. 
A review of the testimony of plaintiff's expert, Mr. 
Wright, reveals that speculative nature of plaintiff's damage 
evidence. Mr. Wright premised his opinions on conditions which 
existed in 1977 when he prepared his first report. Even 
assuming, arguendo, that his formula and methods for calculating 
plaintiff's damages were sound in 1977, one cannot conclude that 
they are sound today. Further, his opinion was based on a 
forecast of the future from 1977. Such a forecast cannot be 
used, even under an income approach to valuation, when at the 
date of trial there are 13 years of established experience. 
Wright's opinion was patently flawed and as such inadmissible. 
See Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Department of Revenue. 7 Or. T. 
R. 203, 1977 W.L. 1615, *9 (Or. Tax 1977)(estimate of operating 
income was improper where actual data was available); Rosen v. 
City of Milwaukee. 72 Wis. 2d 653, 242 N.W.2d 681 (1976). 
At the time of the first trial, the plaintiff's shopping 
center was new, therefore, it had no rental history upon which 
to base an opinion of damages. Thus, it was perfectly reason-
able to project damages into the future based upon the best 
market variables then available. In contrast, when making that 
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same estimate of damages today, one cannot rely upon the same 
unknowns which were relied upon thirteen years ago because many 
of the unknowns have become knowns. Plaintiffs evidence, as 
present by Mr. Wright, was flawed and speculative in today's 
world because it ignored "established experience or direct 
inference from known circumstances." 22 Am. Jr. 2d Damages § 25 
at page 46 (1965). 
By relying on evidence which, by virtue of time and 
experience, has been ejected from the category of "best evidence 
available to afford a reasonable basis for estimating it's 
loss", id.. plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof to 
produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish damages with 
reasonable certainty. 
Plaintiff's evidence concerning the claim for the curb and 
gutter work and miscellaneous piping was similarly speculative. 
The only support for the jury's award was the following tes-
timony: 
A [by John Price] And the planting areas would be 
about .25 cents a square foot and then the you have 
got the curb and gutter basically would be $3.50 a 
lineal foot and you have got some striping which would 
be about $1.20 installed and then you have got the 
miscellaneous piping in there and that was about 
$300.00 for that and then you got your overhead and 
few other just inhouse costs and then you just add 
them up and it comes up as I stated $5600.00. But we 
can be accurate, you know, present that I am sorry 
that I didn't do that. 
(R. 1306.)2 
2Total values were extrapolated from this evidence by 
plaintiff's attorney in closing argument as follows: 
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Because plaintiff failed to present evidence which could 
establish with reasonable certainty plaintiff's alleged damages, 
plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case. Defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict and its subsequent motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The uncontroverted evidence established that the additional 
space would have been illegal because there was insufficient 
parking. This case should be remanded with instructions to 
grant defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
In the alternative, this case should be remanded for a new 
trial, with instructions that evidence of valuation based on 
The first is that Mr. Price testified that the 
additional curb and gutter in this area cost him $3.50 
per lineal foot. 
Mr. Smith testified that there were 60 additional 
lineal feet because of the addition of this area here. 
It is a simply multiplication problem there, $3.50 per 
foot times 60 feet, $210.00. 
Secondly Mr. Price testified that it cost him an 
additional $300.00 for some miscellaneous piping in 
this area. WE believe those are the sums that you 
should award as costs incurred in minimizing damages 
in addition to the architectural fees. 
The undersigned counsel for defendant was not able to 
locate any evidentiary support for the assertion that 60 
additional feet of curb and gutter was required. 
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estimated income must be excluded where evidence of actual 
income is available. 
DATED this 11th day of April, 1988. 
JACKSON HOWARD, and ~/T 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
11th day of April, 1988. 
Bryce D. Panzer, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAHXOUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a limited partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





Civil No. 41,071 
Please answer the following questions. 
1. A. Was Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc. negligent? 
YES ^ NO 
B. Was the negligence, if any, of Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc. a 
proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff? 
YES NO 
2. A. Was Price-Orem Investment Company negligent? 
YES NO 
B. Was the negligence, if any, of Price-Orem Investment Company a 
proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff? 
YES NO 
3. (If you answered both 1(b) and 2(b) "Yes," answer this question): 
Considering all the negligence which proximately caused damages as 100%, what 
percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
A. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc.? fr & % 
B. Price-Orem Investment Company? T P % 
TOTAL: 100% 
What sum, if any, would fairly compensate Pricc-Orem Investment 
Company for its losses? 
DATED this .13 day of June, 1987. 
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BRYCE D. PANZER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Jr 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a limited partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROLLINS, BROWN AND GUNNELL, 
INC. , 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT 
Civil No. 41071 
Judge Park 
This action came on regularly for trial on June 1, 2, and 
3, 1987, before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, District Judge, sitting 
with a jury, in Provo, Utah. Plaintiff Price-Orem Investment 
Company was represented by Bryce D. Panzer of the law firm of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau. Defendant Rollins, Brown and 
Gunnell, Inc. was represented by Jackson Howard of the law firm 
of Howard, Lewis and Peterson. A jury of eight people was regularly 
impaneled and sworn to try the action. Witnesses on behalf of the 
parties were sworn and examined and documents and exhibits were 
admitted on behalf of the parties. After hearing the evidence 
and arguments of counsel, and after receiving the instructions 
76E 
of the court, the jury retired to consider a special verdict and 
subsequently returned the special verdict into court with the 
following answers: 
1. A. Was Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc. negligent? 
YES X NO 
B. Was the negligence, if any, of Rollins, Brown 
and Gunnell, Inc. a proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff? 
YES X NO 
2. A. Was Price-Orem Investment Company negligent? 
YES X NO 
B. Was the negligence, if any, of Price-Orem 
Investment Company a proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff? 
YES X NO 
3. Considering all the negligence which proximately caused 
damages as 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attribut-
able to: 
A. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc.? 60% 
B. Price-Orem Investment Company? 40% 
TOTAL: 100% 
4. What sum, if any, would fairly compensate Price-Orem 
Investment Company for its losses? $33,861.00 
The special verdict was dated June 3, 1987, and signed by 
the foreperson, William L. Gappmayer. 
-2-
The Court having considered and denied defendant's motions 
for a directed verdict and for judgment N.O.V., and various 
other post-trial motions having been resolved, 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and the special verdict 
returned by the jury in the above action, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff, Price-Orem 
Investment Company, be and hereby is rendered judgment against 
defendant, Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., in the amount of 
$20,316.60, together with costs fixed at $894.20; for a total 
judgment of $21,210.80, together with post-judgment interest 
on the whole thereof at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after June 4, 1987/, until paid, 
**• -2k DATED this / day of tA6S$te^&*<-^, 1987. 




APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorney iff 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
By 
Jackson Howard 
Attorneys for Defendant 
-3-
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Sandra Westergard, being duly sworn, states that she is 
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for Plaintiff 
and that she served the attached Judgment on Jury Verdict 
Civil No. 41071 , upon the following parties by placing 
a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Jackson Howard 
Attorney for Defendant 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84603 
by depositing the same in the United States Mail, first-class 
mail, postage prepaid, on the //\0- day of August
 9 1987. 
M TO nef^re me on th. 
August , 1987. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN befo his ^ 3? ~ day of 
psraryPublic 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
76£ 
APPENDIX "C" 
;;v <:>P * ft 7%t ": 
'Z~l vLl lO S • ^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT CO., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROLLINS, BROWN & GUNNELL, 
INC. , 
Defendant. 
RULING AND AMENDMENT TO 
JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 41071 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Amended 
Motion to Tax Costs. 
The Court having considered the motion determines that 
the cost of transcripts in the sum of $614.90 are not proper 
costs to be awarded the plaintiff and the Order of the Court 
dated September 1, 1987 and the Judgment on Jury Verdict dated 
September 1, 1987 is hereby amended to read that plaintiff is 
granted judgment for costs fixed at $297.30. 
Dated this 17th day of September. 1987. 
XT: BY THI 
IX/l*. TARK^ JUDGE 
cc: Bryce D. Panzer, Esq, 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
APPENDIX "D" 
ORDINANCE NO, 232 
An Ordinance amending Section 29-3-10 of the Revised Ordinance of Orem 
City, Utah, 1959. Repealing any and all Ordinances in conflict and declaring 
an emergency. 
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF CI3i CITY,,UTAH: 
Section I. That Section 29-3-10-10-1 and Section 29-3-10-10-2 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Orem City, Utah, 1959, be amended to read as follows: 
29-3-10-10-1 There r V H be provided and maintained at time or erection of 
any main building or structure, off-street parking space with adequate 
provisions for ingress and egrens by standard-sized automobiles as 
hereinafter set forth, ''Said parking space shall >e located on the 
same lot as1the building it is to serve. 
Whenever existing main buildings are enlarged or j live greased'in 
capacity, or"are changed In use, additional-offTStxeetr parking space 
shall be provided which will heet the requirements applying to such 
enlargement. 
A. One, two, three,* four, and multiple dwellings* Two (2) off-street 
parking Spaces shall be provided for each dwelling unit. (Amended 
by Ord. 132: July 15, 1968; amended by Ord. 150: Sept 2, 1969) 
B. Boarding houses, hotels, or rooming houses, "batching'' apartments, 
and dwelling units occupied by three or more persons not related 
by blood or marriage. At least two (2) off-at^ree^ parking spaces 
aha 11; be provided -for each two guaats accx>mjgo<Jated:*in such build-
ings, or two spaces for each room used for sleeping, purposes, 
whichever is greater. (Amended by Ord. 132:: July .15* 1968; 
Amended by Ord 150; Sept 2, 1969) 
C. Tourist homes and courts, motels, and motor hotels." One (1) 
space for 6ach livihg or sleeping unit plus parking-: for all 
accessory uses-dft htetein defined. 
D. Schools. One (iyoff-street parking spaceC;shall be provided 
for each 3.5 seats in an auditorium plus two (2) off-street 
spaces shall be provided for each classroom or station. 
E. Clubs and dance halls. One (1) off-street space shall be provided 
for each 30 square feet of floor space in the «ain building. 
(Amended by Ord. 132: July 15, 1968) 
F. Churches, funeral homes, assembly buildings, sport Arenas, parking 
space shall be provided for each three seats in the main assembly 
room. Where benches are used, 20 inches of bench space shall be 
considered as space for one seat. Where movable chairs are used, 
7 square feet shall be considered as space for one seat. (Attended 
by Ord 132: July 15, 1968) 
G. Furniture and appliance stores, household equipment or furniture 
repair shops. One (1) space for each 600 square feet of gross 
leasable areat 
H. Retail ^ stares, shops1, etc., except as provided in No. ^ g " above. 
Five and one-hilf (5/5) off-st£eet parking spaces for.,each 1000 
square feet of floor space contained in the building exclusive of 
furnace and mechanical and utility rooms, enclosed walkways, malls, 
and restrooms. 







J. Wholesale buildings or warehouses. .75 off-street parking spaces 
for each 2000 square feet of gross,, floor area",ribt .75 space for 
each person, employed durir^the highest employment shift, .which-
ever is greater.• 
K. Medical or dental clinics. Six (6) spaces fof each doctor's 
office. i j ^ 
L. Banks, post offices, business and professional offices. Two (2) 
spaces plus one (1) space for each 3C0 square feet of -ijloor area . 
M. Restaurants. One (1) space for each 2.5 Seats or thr^e (3) spaces 
per 100 square feet of floor area, whichever is greater. 
!!. Drive-in restaurants. One (1) off-street parking space,for each 
petscn employed during the highest employment shift. 
0. Hlhiature golf courses or golf driving ranges. One (1) off-street 
parking space shall be provided for each hole, station, or tee. 
P. Automobile or machinery s-^s and service garages. TJwo (2) spaces 
plus one (1) space for each 400 square feet o3E floor fire^ . 
<J. Day-care centers ,fcr children. Four (4) spaces plus one (1) space 
per*500 square feet of floor area. 
R. Nursing hones. Four (A) off-street parking spaces plus one (1) 
space per each five (5) beds. 
S. Hospitals. Two (2) off-street parking spaces per bed. 
T. itenufacturing plants, research, or testing laboratories, bottling 
plants. One (1) space for each person employed on the highest 
employment shift* 
The number Aof parking spaces ror uses not ispecitied nerein shall be 
determined by the Planning Commission, being guided where appropriate 
by the requirements s*~t forth herein for uses of buildings which, in 
theqopinion0of the Zoning Administrator or Planning Commission,, are 
similar to the use or buildi-3 under considerationj 
29-3-10-10^2 • In,>ny residential, ^ g^icuijtyral, industrial,' or C-l, H-l, or 
R & D"l Zone, no private or public parking lot shall be located within 
the front setback which feces on apublic street. In all SQnes, outside 
parking space chall be hard surfaced with bituminous mate^a^ or cement. 
(Amended by Ord U 2 : July 15, 1963) 
Section II, That all Ordinances or parts of Ordinances in conflict herewith 
are repealed. 
Section III. Any person violating any of the provisions of this,,Ordinance 
shall be guilty of misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall $e punished 
by a f#ine-in any sum^ip^ exceeding $299.00, or by imprisonment^or a period 
of #*irty (30) days/ or both fine ana imprisonment. Each and ev^ jry day such 
violation shall be continued shall be considered a seoarate offense. 
Section IV. Because of impending development within Orem City, UjU}h, *md 
more particularly within the land herein abcye described, an emergency exists, 
In order to preserve the health, safety, Convenience, and peace and 
general welfare of the'City of Orem, and therinhabitants, thereof? this Ordi-
nance shall take effect upon its passage* and first publication in the Or em-
Geneva Times, a newspaper of general circulation within the City. 
PASSED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OP OR©! CITY, UTAH, THIS'' "9th DAY OF 
October 1973. 
